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Abstract
Politicians can use the public sector to give jobs to cronies, at the expense of the e-
ciency of those organisations and general welfare. Motivated by a simple model of cronyism
that predicts spikes in appointments to state-owned rms near elections, we regress 1980-
2008 monthly hirings across all state-owned Portuguese rms on the country's political
cycle. In most specications, we also consider private-sector rms as a control group. Con-
sistent with the model, we nd that public-sector appointments increase signicantly over
the months just before a new government takes oce. Hirings also increase considerably
just after elections but only if the new government is of a dierent political colour than its
predecessor. These results also hold when conducting the analysis separately at dierent
industries and most job levels, including less skilled positions. We nd our evidence to be
consistent with cronyism and politically-induced misallocation of public resources.
Keywords: Corruption, matched employer-employee panel data, public-sector employment.
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11 Introduction
\No jobs for the boys", declared Ant onio Guterres, the newly-elected Portuguese prime-
minister, shortly after his party had regained power in October 1995. The statement was
made when his party had spent as many as ten years in opposition and his call sought to
address the perception - in Portugal and in many other countries - that governments make
use of their powers to appoint cronies and apparatchiks to public-sector positions. Many of
these appointments are thought to be made regardless of the merits of the appointees or the
needs of the organisations that hire them.
In fact, politicians in power are generally entitled to restructure and create and ll vacan-
cies in the civil service as well as in state-owned rms. Given the considerable asymmetry of
information they enjoy, politicians can hire cronies under the pretense of economy or eciency
gains, even if the purpose of such appointments is to serve strictly private or party-political
goals. Such mismatch between private and public net benets of crony appointments can
easily explain why public-sector employment may swell above a social optimum. This will be
particularly true when taking into account the soft budget constraints of many public-sector
organisations and their reduced exposure to competition (Ades & Tella 1999).
For the reasons above, shedding light on public-sector jobs cronyism is of great impor-
tance. This is particularly true when taking into account the large size of the public sector,
the severe detrimental eects of corruption (Shleifer & Vishny 1993), the evidence of a per-
formance gap between public and private rms (Shleifer 1998), the potential for disruption
of internal labour markets, and the fact that rigid employment protection observed in many
countries (OECD 1994) will make it dicult for new governments to dismiss their antecessors'
cronies. However, an empirical investigation on cronyism is particularly challenging. As in
other types of corruption, the two sides in that process (politicians and their cronies) have a
strong preference to hide their relationship from public scrutiny. In fact, we could not nd
any empirical analysis of jobs cronyism in the economics literature, despite the considerable
anedoctal evidence available in some countries.
This paper lls this large gap by presenting indirect evidence of cronyism. Our method-
ology is motivated by a number of original approaches which uncover strong evidence of
corruption (Duggan & Levitt 2002, Jacob & Levitt 2003, Hsieh & Moretti 2006, Wolfers
2006). In our case, we start by presenting a simple model of cronyism, where politicians sup-
2ply appointments to state-sector rms that are demanded by cronies, in exchange for political
or other favours. Given the greater supply and demand of appointments near general elec-
tion periods, the model predicts spikes in hirings both before and after elections. The model
also predicts that post-election spikes will be stronger if the new government is of a dierent
political colour.
To test these predictions, we require data that are not only rich enough in terms of its
coverage of the public sector and the appointments made there but also that are measured at a
relatively high frequency (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya 2004). This paper draws on particularly
rich data that meet these two requirements: a longitudinal matched employer-employee panel
data set covering the population of rms that operate in a country, Portugal. Besides a large
set of variables, including the degree of public ownership of each rm in each year, the data
also lists the hiring date of each worker in each rm and in each year. We use this information
to construct a monthly time-series of hirings in the state-owned sector, which according to
the law are only overseen but not directly managed by the government. We then regress this
time-series on the political cycle of the country - namely indicators of the months just before
and just after a new government takes oce - to test our model of cronyism. We also generate
a similar time-series of private-sector hirings and that we use as a possible counterfactual,
for instance to control for business cycle or seasonal eects that may be correlated with the
election calendar.
Our results indicate a systematic impact of the political cycle on the timings of state-
owned rms in Portugal, as predicted by our model of cronyism. We nd signicant evidence
of a large spike in hirings just after a new government takes oce, particularly or only in
the case when the new government is of a dierent political colour (left or right) than the
previous incumbent. Perhaps more striking, we also nd that hirings tend to increase just
before a new government takes over, regardless of the future outcome of the general elections.
Furthermore, the results hold under dierent specications and dierent subsets of the data,
including less-skilled workers and rms in most sectors. We also nd that changes in the
top management of private rms (which one could regard as a better equivalent of general
elections, in the context of the private sector), do not result in signicant evidence of hikes in
hirings in those rms, either in the months before or after the new appointment.
These results appear consistent with evidence on the potential gains from privatisation
3(Megginson & Netter 2001, Brown et al. 2006). For instance, Porta & Lopez-De-Silanes (1999)
show that one third of the eciency benets from privatization in Mexico came from trans-
fers from laid-o workers. Bertrand et al. (2007) nd that publicly-traded rms managed
by politically connected CEOs display higher rates of job creation (and show lower prots)
compared to unconnected rms. Our ndings, while emphasising the microeconomic impor-
tance of hirings on top of its macroeconomic implications (Pissarides 2009), may also lead
to a partial reinterpretation of the results from the political business cycle literature (Rogo
1990) that tend to regard higher levels of public employment during election years as evidence
of opportunistic behaviour by incumbents to persuade voters of their competence. Most im-
portant, while there has been considerable anecdotal evidence of cronyism in many countries,
this is the rst paper that provides systematic empirical evidence about this phenomenom.
This evidence may hopefully pave the way for measures that expose and erode cronyism in
the future.
The next section presents the theory that motivates our analysis. Section 3 briey de-
scribes the Portuguese political system and the state-owned economic sector. Section 4
presents the data used in the paper and some descriptive statistics, after which Section 5
describes the main results. Sections 6 and 7 study their robustness and present some exten-
sions, respectively. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Theory
This section oers a simple model to think about cronyism and its empirically testable man-
ifestations. As mentioned above, in this paper we focus on the aspects of cronyism that arise
when politicians appoint to public-sector positions friends and individuals that helped or can
help those politicians, regardless of the cronies' qualications or suitability for those posi-
tions. Cronyism therefore corresponds to expenditure of public resources to pay for (political
or other) benets enjoyed by politicians, even if it may promote mismanagement and further
waste. This will also typically involve discrimination of people more suitable for those jobs.
There are two types of agents in our model of cronyism: politicians (either in power
or in opposition) and cronies. Politicians care about obtaining or keeping power, and this
process will typically be facilitated by favours made by cronies, although cronies can also be
of assistance in other, non-political spheres. Such favours can take a very large number of
4forms, including campaigning and grassroots activities, donations, media work (in favour of
the politician or against her opponents), `dirty tricks' and personal favours.
On the other hand, cronies care about appointments in the public sector (including state-
owned rms), which typically involve rents. The size of the rents will depend on the specic
job at stake but it will generally entail a combination of higher wages, job stability, lower
eort, discretionary budgets, etc. The utility from such combination of job amenities would
not be feasible in the cronies' next best alternative in a non-crony job. Of course, these
crony appointments can be made only by politicians in power, implying that cronies helping
politicians in opposition will see their eorts pay o only if the politicians that those cronies
support are elected in the next elections.
The interaction between politicians and cronies creates an informal market for appoint-
ments in the public sector. These appointments can be measured in the model in terms not
only of their number but also of their importance, for instance by the size of the rent involved.
Furthermore, the market is segmented between current and prospective, after-election jobs.
While the former type of jobs will be oered only by politicians in power, the latter can be
oered both by politicians in power and by politicians in opposition - but only delivered by
whoever wins the next election.
In each market, the supply of appointments by politicians responds (positively) to their
price, which is measured in terms of the relevance of the favour made by the crony to the
politician. The supply of appointments will also be aected by several other variables, which
we group under the separate labels of `political', `economic' and `private'. Political variables
concern aspects such as opposition from public-sector ocers, legal issues (e.g. the law may
oer politicians dierent latitude in terms of discretionary appointments), competition within
the cabinet and party, and reputation costs. Economic variables refer to the size of the
public sector (countries or periods with bigger public sectors will generate more opportunities
for placements) and budget constraints faced by each department. Finally, private aspects
include the personal gains from the appointment - cronies may be relatives and politicians
will also care about the welfare of their (extended) families. Moreover, placing cronies in the
public sector can involve an insurance element from the point of view of the politician herself,
as it may also open avenues for reciprocation in the future, in particular if the politician
loses power. The placement of cronies in strategic positions may also facilitate more crony
5appointments in the future.
The case of politicians in opposition and their market for prospective appointments is
similar. The main dierence is the uncertainy of the reward (the appointment), as that
will depend on the election result. This is compounded by the non-binding nature of the
arrangement between the opposition politicians and their cronies, given the time gap between
the favour (before elections) and the appointment (after elections, assuming the candidate
wins).1
Turning to the demand for appointments, it is expected to respond (negatively) to its price
and also to be aected by a number of other variables, including the proximity to elections and
the likely election result. Cronies of the same political colour of the incumbent understand
that the time for safe, public-sector appointments will be running out, given the risk that
their politicians and parties losing elections. This applies in particular to cronies appointed
to political positions in a given government (advisers, assistants, etc), whose jobs will expire
by default when that government comes to an end. Similarly, cronies of opposition politicians
understand that the run-up to elections is an important time to deliver favours of interest
for the possible future politicians in power. These two forces will increase the crony demand
during periods close to elections.
From the above aspects, it follows that the proximity to elections will aect both the
supply of and demand for appointments. First, the model predicts that the behaviour of both
politicians in power and challengers will shift the supply curve of crony appointments to the
right just before elections: for instance, the eects from the favours will increase in terms of
enhancing the probability of (re-)election. Moreover, appointments just before elections could
mean a shorter period for the public opinion to gain awareness of them. Finally, there will be
little or no reputation cost if the politician loses the elections. These factors mean that the
proximity to elections increases the supply of appointments for every price (favour) paid by
cronies. Second, for the reasons discussed above, the demand for appointments will similarly
increase near elections.
We can therefore say that, in terms of predictions, rst of all, we would expect that,
1While this moral hazard can be an important disadvantage faced by challengers, one would still expect
that cronies would generally be rewarded with the promised appointment after the election if their politician
wins. For instance, the crony may threaten to let the public know about the pre-elections arrangements if the
newly-election politician renegues on her promise. Less cynical `gift-exchange' views may also apply (Akerlof
1982), not to mention the `private' reasons mentioned above (e.g. the gains from appointing relatives).
6under a null hypothesis of no cronyism, the electoral cycle would not inuence public-sector
hirings. In particular in the case of state-sector rms studied in this paper, hiring decisions will
be independent from election dates. This may contrast with the case of explicitly political
appointments in government positions (ministers, advisors, spokespersons, etc), which are
expected to increase soon after elections, with or without cronyism. However, if cronyism
applies, then periods both just before and just after elections will be times of above-average
crony appointments, as their demand and supply curves will both shift to the right. This
positive relationship between election proximity (both before and after) and hirings by state-
owned rms is the key prediction that we take to our data.
Another prediction we test is that the post-election hirings spike will be greater when
there is a government of a dierent political colour than its antecessor. This follows from
the fact that the deferred appointments, conditional on the victory of the challenger, will
only apply in that case. In contrast, if the incumbent wins, their appointments will be split
between the pre- and after-elections months, with a greater share expected to be made in the
pre-election months. It should also be mentioned that our model is unable to infer the actual
magnitude of cronyism, in particular in terms of appointment levels. However, we argue we
can detect cronyism from dierences over time in hirings levels, in particular in the months
close to electoral periods, provided the data are comprehensive enough.
Next we present some background on the country under study in this paper, Portugal,
and its data, which covers appointments in all state-sector rms over a period of nearly 350
months and 11 general elections.
3 Portugal - some background
3.1 Political system
After a complex period that followed the 1974 revolution, the Portuguese government system
became reasonably stable since the early 1980s. Notwithstanding that, there have been 13
governments since 1980 and only four of them led to a full four-year term of oce - see Table
1.2 The table also lists the parties that led the governments that took oce following each
2The four main governing components in Portugal are the president of the republic, the parliament, the
government, and the courts. The president is elected to a ve year term and has a supervising non-executive
role. The Parliament is a chamber of 230 representatives elected in four-year terms. The government is headed
by the prime minister, the leader of the most voted party, who chooses the ministers and their deputies.
7one of those general elections. This table highlights the stability in the party structure: PS
(`Partido Socialista', left wing) and PSD (`Partido Social Democrata', centre/right wing) have
been, by far, the most important parties. These two parties have typically alternated in power
every election or every other election, except in 1983-1985, a period of balance-of-payments
crisis, when the two parties formed government together.
Table 1 also highlights the fact that, despite the relatively large number of governments,
most of them enjoyed a full majority in parliament (at least 50% + 1 of the representatives),
which can facilitate considerably the approval of new laws and policies. In some cases, coali-
tions were formed, typically between PSD and CDS (a smaller, right-wing party). Another
point of information is that the political colour of the government changed six times over the
30-year period covered, even if one party enjoyed a 10-year uninterrupted spell in power (PSD,
from the mid-80s to the mid-90s). That spell only came to an end when Mr Guterres won
the 1995 general election, prompting the memorable announcement mentioned in Section 1.
When the same party (PS or PSD) won the general elections for a second time, the new gov-
ernment was always led by the same prime-minister and many of the same cabinet ministers.
The exception was the early 1980s, in one case because of the death of the prime-minister in
a plane crash.
As to election dates, these are tentatively scheduled for September, unless a government
comes to an end before the end of its mandate. In any case, (state-owned or private) rms
have no inuence on election dates, which makes us believe that it is reasonable to regard
these dates as exogenous with respect to rms' hirings.3
3.2 State-sector rms
While the model presented in Section 2 can be applied to all public-sector appointments,
our empirical analysis will focus on state-sector rms only. This is not only because of data
constraints but also because government-related appointments could be expected to respond
to the electoral cycle even in an environment without cronyism. On the other hand, according
to the law, state-owned rms in Portugal are supposed to be managed so to pursue economic
Ministers are responsible for overseeing state-owned rms. Some governments (7, 8 and 16) did not follow from
elections but from the resignation or death of the prime-minister.
3See also Coelho et al. (2006) and Veiga & Veiga (2007) who report evidence on political business cycles in
Portuguese municipalities, using annual data. They interpret the increase in employment levels of municipalities
in the year of elections as corresponding to eorts by mayors to enhance voters' perceptions of the mayors'
abilities.
8(and social) goals, in which case the political cycle would not aect appointments apart from
a small number of top positions (e.g. CEO's) and then only after elections.
The number and importance of state-owned rms is still considerable today, after a wave
of nationalisations following the 1974 coup d'etat. Although there have been more than 230
privatisation events from 1987 to 2005, involving revenues of nearly 25 billion euros in nominal
prices (Ministry of Finance 2006), the state-owned enterprise sector still accounted for about
4.7% of GDP and about 2.4% of employment in 2005 (Ministry of Finance 2006). In fact,
state-owned rms can be found in a large number of sectors, including utilities, transport,
infrastructures (air, rail, ports, roads, wholesale markets), nance, health, urban renewal,
media and culture.
The state also holds equity in a number of private rms, most of them having been
privatised in the recent past (energy and water rms, for instance). Some of these rms
are still potentially subject to considerable state intervention via the so-called `golden share'
mechanism, which allows the state to have veto powers in a number of decisions taken by
those rms, even if the actual percentage of ownership rights in those rms is only residual
(a form of minority ownership).4
Overall, it would be dicult to argue that many of the rms currently owned by the
Portuguese state meet most of the economic conditions for public ownership to be able to
improve upon private ownership - for instance, opportunities for cost reductions that lead to
non-contractible reduction in quality, weak potential for innovation, weak competition and
consumer choice, and weak reputation mechanisms (Shleifer 1998). Moreover, state-owned
rms as a group have always made losses: for instance, state transfers in 2005 amounted to
7.4 billion euros (Ministry of Finance 2006), even if this gure does not include loans taken
by those state-owned rms that are indirectly subscribed by the state (but not accounted for
in the state budget).
One could argue that the large number of rms that remain in the public sector would
follow from the cronyism opportunities that arise from the control by politicians in power
of a large number of rms in the state-owned sector. However, while government ministers
4As this mechanism is disregarded in this paper (i.e. we ignore golden shares and dene a rm as state-owned
based on whether the state owns 50% or more of the rm), our results can be seen as lower-bound estimates
of any cronyism eects documented later. There are also a smaller number of private rms that become state-
owned because they went bankrupt when the state was the main creditor. These rms are managed by the
state until they are liquidated or auctioned to private investors. See Ministry of Finance (1998) and Ministry
of Finance (2006) for more detail.
9and deputy ministers are responsible for overseeing the management of each state-owned
rm, including the appointment of their CEO's and administration members, they are not
supposed to inuence the day-to-day management of those rms, including recruitment issues.
On the other hand, the recruitment of employees by state-owned rms does not need to meet
the supposedly more stringent procedures required in the case of the appointment of public
servants, even if the two types of workers are protected by rigid employment laws (Martins
2009). The possibly easier appointment process in the case of state-owned rms could be a
particularly interesting avenue for politicians to return the favours made by their cronies.
Finally, we conducted an analysis of the wage practices of state-owned rms compared
to private rms (Martins 2010) using the same comprehensive matched employer-employee
panel data set that we describe next. We found always signicant wage premiums in state-
owned rms, even in models controlling for a large range of heterogeneity sources (workers or
spell xed eects). These results are consistent with the premise in our model that jobs in
state-owned rms are likely to involve rents.
4 Data
The data used in this paper are derived from `Quadros de Pessoal' (Personnel Records), a
particularly rich annual census of all rms that operate in Portugal and that employ at least
one worker, collected by the Ministry of Employment. According to employment laws and the
census regulations, each rm is legally required to provide extensive information about itself
and also about each one of its workers that are employed during the census reference month
(March, up to 1993, and October, from 1994). Given the extensive coverage of the data, the
only types of workers excluded are the self-employed (including employers that do not earn
wages) and public servants. Moreover, the period covered by the data is relatively long, as
the census has been ongoing since 1982, allowing us to track the political cycle over nearly 30
years, up to 2008.
The long list of variables available in the `Quadros de Pessoal' data set includes unique,
time-invariant identiers for each rm, for each establishment and for each employee. Other
rm-level variables are the economic sector/industry (ve-digit code), detailed region codes,
number of employees (constructed from the worker-level data), rm age, sales in the previous
year, and equity. Crucially for the purpose of this paper, there is also information, for each
10rm and each year, on the ownership structure of the rm, measured by the percentage of
voting rights controlled by each of these three types of investors: private/domestic, foreign,
or public (Portuguese state).
At the worker-level, the data make available information about schooling, age (month and
year when the worker was born), gender, occupation (ve-digit code), job level (a two-digit
variable, comparable across rms and over time) and promotions (month and year when the
worker was last promoted in the rm). There are several wage variables, all of them expressed
in monthly values (the most common frequency of pay in Portugal), including base wages,
tenure-related payments, overtime pay, `subsidies' and `other payments' (such as bonuses and
prot- or performance-related pay), and information about normal and overtime hours.
Importantly, the data also include information about the month and the year when each
employee was hired by the rm. We use these two variables to construct a time-series that
counts the number of workers hired in each month by type of rm (state- or private-owned).5
For instance, we measure the number of state-sector hirings in, say, June 2005, from the num-
ber of workers hired in that month according to the lists of personnel of all state-sector rms
as reported in the October 2005 census. This variable will inevitably miss short employment
spells, namely those that start at a dierent month than the census month of the year (March
or October). For instance, a worker hired in June 2005 that leaves the rm before October
2005 will not be counted.6 Moreover, as 1990 and 2001 worker-level data were not released
by the Ministry for research purposes (due to nancial restrictions), we rely on longer-lasting
employment spells in those periods.7 Finally, in order to extend the period covered slightly,
we also considered appointments made since April 1980 that last until March 1982, the rst
census available. Later in the paper, we explain how we take these data issues into account
when estimating our results and check the robustness of the results to dierent measurement
approaches.
In order to draw on a common support of rms and minimise measurement error, we drop
5See Martins et al. (2010) for another analysis of new hires, in that case about their real wage cyclicality,
also using the `Quadros de Pessoal' data set.
6Workers that join the rm after the census date (when rms report their data late) or without information
on their date of entry into the rm are dropped from our analysis. These cases account for a very small number
of observations.
7Specically, we consider people that were hired in each month: 1) from April 1989 (the rst month after
the previous available census month, March 1989, given the lack of 1990 data) until March 1991 (the following
census date); or 2) from November 2000 (the rst month after the previous available census month, October
2000, given the lack of 2001 data) until October 2002 (the following census date).
11rms that do not appear in at least ve years in the `Quadros' data set over the 1982-2008
period and that do not employ at least 20 workers in at least one year. Firms are dened
as state-owned in a year if at least 50% of the voting rights in that year are held by the
Portuguese state.8 Given the large size of the private sector, when compared to the public
sector, and the fact that we have population data, we consider a 10% sample of private sector
rms (and all the years and workers of these sampled rms).9
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the months considered in our analysis, from April
1980 to October 2008. The mean monthly hirings in state-owned rms over that period is
584 (standard deviation 241). The mean schooling levels of those newly-hired workers across
all months is 10.4 years of schooling and their mean age is 28.9. Their mean job level is 5.2,
in a scale that ranges from one (top managers) to eight (apprentices). The mean real hourly
earnings (2008 prices) are 7.05 euros. In terms of the private-sector rms, we nd that the
number of mean hirings is greater (2,668). Mean schooling, job level and earnings are lower
(7.6, 5.9 and 4.8, respectively), while age is higher (30).10
Applying equally to the two groups, the mean dierence between the census month and
the month of entry across all cells is 7 months (standard deviation 5.2). 45% of the obser-
vations refer to the pre-1994 period (when the census month was in March). Virtually 10%
of the observations concern a month in the three-month period just after a government takes
oce, while nearly 5% of all months concern a month in the three-month period just after a
government of a dierent political colour than its antecessor takes oce.
Table 3 lists the number of new hires in each year of the `Quadros' data set, separately
for state- and private-owned rms. In the case of state-owned rms, the number of new
hires in each year ranges from nearly 24,000 in 1982 to little more than 5,000 in 1993. This
dispersion reects the diering number of state-owned rms over the years, the business cycle
and the dierent coverage of dierent years. As explained above, we use the 1982, 1991 and
8In the case of privatisations, as we do not know the month when the type of ownership changed, we assume
this occurred just after the last census month when the rm was state-owned.
9We conduct the sampling at the rm level, not at the rm-observation level, i.e. we sample from a list of
all rms in our data that meet the restrictions described above. This ensures that we can follow longitudinally
the sampled rms for as many years as possible.
10These statistics refer to the characteristics of the workers as measured during the census month, some of
which will dier somewhat from the month when they were hired (e.g. wages).
122002 `Quadros' year les to cover 24-month periods, while we use the 1994 data to cover
a 19-month period; all other year les cover a 12-month period only. The total number of
newly-hired workers over the 1980-2008 period is 205,719. More than 70% of these workers
are hired by rms that appear in our data as state-owned at least since 1982.
Table 3 also presents the average tenure of the newly-hired workers, measured in months at
the census month (March or October). For state-owned rms, this statistic varies between 4.7
(1987) and 11.5 (1982), where the censuses used to compute 24-month hirings series naturally
resulting in higher mean tenure values. As to the age of these workers hired in each year, the
range is between 26.5 (1999) and 32.2 (2003). The last three columns of Table 3 report the
same statistics as above but for the comparison group of private rms. Consistent with the
results in Table 2, the number of workers hired in every period is much higher, ranging from
about 17,000 (1984) to nearly 62,000 (1991). Average tenure per year is lower, suggesting a
greater percentage of shorter spells, i.e. people hired early in the period covered by each census
are less likely to stay until the census month, or a dierent distribution of appointment months,
or some combination of the two factors. Finally, there is some indication of an increasing trend
in the age of the new hires, unlike in the case of state-owned rms, even if the range is similar
(between 27.3 and 33.0).11
Our monthly hirings series of state-owned rms (as dened above) are presented in Figure
1. The gure also highlights the three-month periods immediately after a new government
takes oce (and the cases when the new government is of a dierent political colour than
its predecessor in dark grey), in accordance with Table 1. There are clear examples of an
overlap between a spike in hirings and such three-month periods, namely in late 1985/early
1986, mid 2002 and mid 2005, all of them coinciding with governments of a dierent political
colour. In fact, there are fewer examples of overlap between new governments of the same
political colour as their predecessors and spikes in hirings (e.g. 1981, late 1999/early 2000) and
those magnitudes are smaller. Figure 2 complements the information above by depicting the
monthly hirings of both state-owned and private rms. One nds some overlap between spikes
in hirings of the two groups of rms and the periods after elections - e.g in late 1985/early
11The number of workers employed by state-owned rms ranges from a peak of more than 280,000 in 1986 to
79,000 in 2007 and 2008, following the privatisations described in Section 3.2, while the number of state-owned
rms ranges from 110 in 1992 to 244 in 2005. The increasing trend over the last decade reects the breaking up
of older rms into smaller ones and also the emergence of new, smaller sized public-owned rms. See (Martins
2010) for more details.
131986. On the other hand, we observe the opposite, i.e. a negative spike in private hirings
during the period just after the general election in late 1995.
Overall, we interpret the eyeball evidence above as encouraging as to the scope for the
political cycle to drive hirings of state-owned rms, either when taken in isolation or when
considering the contrast between state-owned and private rms. Section 5 will subject these
suggestive ndings to more precise statistical tests.
5 Results
5.1 State-sector only
Following the theoretical discussion, our empirical analysis is based on the examination of the
relationship between hirings and the electoral cycle. Specically, we start by estimating the
following equation, based on monthly data for the state-owned sector only, in the spirit of an
event study:
Hiringst = 1NewGovtt + 2NewColourt + X
j
t3 + et (1)
The dependent variable, Hiringst, corresponds to the logarithm of state-owned rms'
hirings in month t. NewGovtt is a dummy variable equal to one in the rst three months
after a new government takes oce (and zero otherwise), while NewPartyt is a dummy
variable equal to one in the rst three months after a new government of a dierent political
colour than its predecessor takes oce (and zero otherwise), as indicated in Table 1. We
pick a time range of three months as it strikes us as a reasonable period of time when the
post-elections spike may arise (later we examine the robustness of our ndings to this choice).
The Xt vector of variables includes several time controls: a dummy for each month (Jan-
uary, February, ..., December) to pick up seasonal eects, a dummy for each month in the
period up to March 1993 (when the pattern of seasonality may be dierent because of the
dierent census month), a variable (`Distance') capturing the number of months between the
census month and t (ranging from zero to 23), and a quadratic trend. These variables serve to
control for systematic dierences in the number of hirings across months and years (because
of business cycle or seasonal eects) that may be correlated with the political cycle.
1 and 2 are the parameters of interest: the former indicates the average percentage
dierence in state-sector hirings during the three-month periods after a new government takes
14oce; the latter parameter indicates any additional eect (on top of 1) on hirings of state-
sector rms if the new government that took oce is of a dierent colour than its predecessor
(i.e. typically a switch from PS to PSD or vice-versa). According to our model, cronyism
would be consistent with signicantly positive coecients for either variables or, at least, a
signicantly positive 2.
Table 4 presents the results, based on dierent versions of equation 1. When considering
only the NewGovtt dummy variable (column 1), its coecient is .150, and is signicant at the
1% level. When considering instead only the NewColourt dummy variable (column 2), again
its coecient is signicant at the 1% level, and its value is larger, .173. When considering
both dummy variables, as in equation 1, the rst coecient is .123 (signicant at the 5%
level), while the second is .057 (not signicant at the 10% level).
These results indicate a statistically and economically signicant increase in hirings, of
more than 10% and potentially as large as 20%, in the three months after a new government
takes oce. The evidence also suggests that the post-elections hike in hirings is more pro-
nounced when the new government is of a dierent political colour than its predecessor, even
if the dierence is not signicant. All results are consistent with our theoretical discussion
above about the eects of cronyism in terms of state-sector hirings.
We now turn our attention to the eects of the electoral cycle on hirings before elections.
In particular we rewrite equation 1 and use instead a dummy variable equal to one in the
three months before elections (or, more generally, a new government). For symmetry and
as a further test of the model, we also consider a dummy variable equal to one in the three
months before elections if there is a change in the political colour of the government in those
forthcoming elections.12
Besides testing directly the prediction of the model regarding pre-elections appointments,
this analysis also addresses an alternative interpretation of the ndings on the post-elections
hirings bump: Hirings may be put on hold in the run up to an election because of the
unpredictability of the election outcome and the future strategic direction of the rm. If this
is the case, then, once the new government takes oce, such held-up appointments could nally
take place, generating a post-elections increase in hirings, as documented in our results based
12Opinion polls typically predicted well which party would win and form government, at least since the
mid-1980s. Any spike in hirings in the pre-elections period could be higher when the incumbent was predicted
to lose.
15on equation 1. This view would not be consistent with cronyism. Even if the Portuguese law
did not require this freeze in pre-elections hirings, it could be that rms adopt this approach
in case they predict the new government to introduce dierent personnel practices, including
a dierent proles of new hires.
Column 4 of Table 4 reports the results when only the rst dummy is considered (the one
equal to one in the three months before elections, regardless of the colour of the government
after elections). Its coecient is .121 and signicant at the 1% level. Column 5 instead
considers only the dummy variable highlighting the same three months before elections but
only if the next government is of a dierent political colour. Again the coecient is positive
(.119), although this time signicant only at the 10% level. When considering both coecients,
the rst one clearly dominates (.117, signicant at the 5% level), as we nd no evidence of
a marginal eect on hirings from the next government after the elections being of a dierent
political colour.
Finally, column 7 reports the results for an equation considering the four dummy variables.
They indicate that there is a hike in hirings both before and after a new government takes
oce (.118 and .126, respectively, both signicant at the 5% level). The point estimate of the
new colour government is larger after the elections than before the elections (.079 and .014,
respectively), but both estimates are imprecise enough not to be signicant even at the 10%
level.
As to the coecients of the time control variables, they are very similar across speci-
cations: the pre-1994 dummy is always insignicant; the distance variable (the number of
months between the census date and the specic month of the hirings data) is negative as
expected; and the trend variable indicates a decreasing number of hirings over the 1980-2008
period, but falling at a declining rate. Moreover, the coecients of the month dummies (not
reported) indicate considerable seasonality, as predicted from Figure 1.
We take these results to indicate that the hike in hirings after elections is not driven
by any systematic decline in appointments before elections. More important, the results
are consistent with our model of cronyism as they indicate that hirings also increase in the
months before elections, and by a similar magnitude. According to our theory, this follows
from the increased demand of and supply for crony appointments in the months before general
elections, generating the observed increase in state-sector hirings both before and after a new
16government takes oce.
5.2 State vs. private sector
As potentially suggested by Figure 2, some months of high state-sector hirings may also cor-
respond to months of high private-sector hirings. In fact, parliamentary elections in many
instances took place in September and governments took oce in October, which may also
be months when rms make many of their new appointments, after the Summer slowdown.
In this case, our spikes in hirings may not necessarily be taken as evidence of cronyism.
Moreover, governments may tend to call early elections for periods of economic expansion,
when hirings increase across the board, In this case, our crony eects would be overestimated.
Alternatively, oppositions may tend to bring down minority governments in periods of down-
turn, in which case our estimates would underestimate the crony eect. Similarly, October or
any other months after a new government takes oce may be periods of lower-than-average
appointments, unlike what we hypothesised above, in which case our estimates would again
underestimate the crony eect.
We investigate the empirical merits of these alternative explanations by estimating a
dierence-in-dierences version of the previous hirings equation, taking the private sector
as a control group. Our identication assumption is that private-sector hirings will not be
subject to cronyism but they will respond similarly to business-cycle or seasonality eects.
We therefore draw on monthly data for both state- and private-sector rms, where the state-
sector hirings series is the same as the one used in Subsection 5.1 while the private-sector
series is as described in Subsection 4.1. The rst version of our new equation is as follows:
Hiringsit = 1NewGovttStateOwnedi+2NewColourtStateOwnedi+3StateOwnedi+t+eit;
(2)
where StateOwnedi is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation pertains to the
state-owned sector and zero if the observation pertains to the private sector. Furthermore, we
also consider month xed eects, t (i.e. one dummy variable for each one of the 342 months
in our data). These xed eects allow us to control as thoroughly as possible for dierences
across months that may be correlated with election dates so we can investigate if there are
systematic dierences in hirings by state-owned rms with respect to their counterparts in
17the private sector near election times. Again, 1 and 1 are the key parameters.
Table 5 presents the results, following a similar format to Table 4. Column 1 reports an
estimate of .294 for the interaction of the new government and the state-owned variables,
signicant at the 1% level (and almost twice as big as its counterpart in Table 4). However,
when turning to column 2, which considers the new political colour eect only, that coecient
triples to .514 with respect to its Table 4 counterpart, and is again signicant at the 1% level.
Finally, when considering both variables at the same time, as in equation 2, the new colour
eect dominates, at .426 (signicant at the 5% level), while the new government coecient is
only .094 and insignicant at the 10% level.
These results indicate that, similarly to the state-sector-only analysis, hirings in the state-
sector respond to the electoral cycle, as predicted by our model of cronyism, even when
controlling very stringently for seasonality and business cycle eects. The new results are
even stronger in terms of the t with theory, as they argue that it is primarily when the
colour of the government switches that the post-electoral spike in hirings occurs. In fact,
if the same party stays in power for a consecutive second (or third) time, then it is likely
that largely the same political agents will again have control of the appointment process
and therefore no new appointments will have to be made, at least not immediately after the
elections, unlike in the case of a new political colour.
Finally, as in the previous subsection, we turn to a version of the main equation where we
consider the eects of the new government (and/or dierent political colour) in the hirings just
before elections. Again we nd systematic evidence of spikes in hires, of an order of magnitude
two to three times larger than in Section 5.1. For instance, when considering only the new
government eect in the three months before (column 4 of Table 5), the coecient is .372
(signicant at the 1% level); when considering only the new colour eect (again in the three
months before), the coecient is .338 (also signicant at the 1% level). When considering
the two variables at the same time (column 6), the new government eect dominates, with a
coecient of .383 (signicant at the 1% level), while the new colour coecient is not signicant,
even at the 10% level.
When pooling the four dummy variables (column 7), we nd that the coecients of the
new political colour (three months after) and the new government (three months before)
dummies are signicant, at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, and their magnitudes are
18above .4. The two main dierences between the two tables (4 and 5) are therefore that
the magnitude of the signicant eects increases by a factor of at least three; and while in
the state-sector-only analysis there are no statistical dierences between same-colour or new-
colour new governments, in the state- vs. private-sector analysis only the new-colour coecient
is signicant.
Overall, we conclude that we nd considerable evidence that state-sector hirings respond
signicantly to the parliamentary political cycle, not only after a new government takes oce
(and, in particular, if such new government is of a dierent political colour than its prede-
cessor), but also before elections, in this case regardless if the future new government is of
the same or dierent political colour. Moreover, these eects are not only signicant in a
statistical sense - they are also particularly important in economic terms, as the hirings spikes
are at least of 10% and potentially as large as 50%, according to the estimates based on a
comparison over time in the public sector or, in our preferred approach, on the contrast with
the private sector, respectively.
6 Robustness
6.1 Month-by-month analysis
Here we conduct an analysis of the monthly hirings in specic reference to the month when
elections take place (see also Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya (2004)). This is a more disaggregate
approach than in our benchmark results above and allows us to gain a more detailed under-
standing of the systematic dierences in hirings over the months before and after elections. In
particular, we consider both the 12 months before elections and the 12 months after elections.
Our rst specication draws on state-sector (log) hirings only, following equation 1, as in









j ElectionsNewColourj + X
j
t + et: (3)
Electionsj is a dummy variable equal to one if a new government takes oce in that
relative month j (and zero, otherwise), in comparison with month t; ElectionsNewColourj
is a dummy variable equal to one if a new government of a dierent colour than the previous
19incumbent takes oce in that month (zero otherwise). The 25 A
j parameters thus indicate
the average percentage dierence in hirings of those months (from 12 months before to 12
months after elections) with respect to the comparison group of months outside this range.
Moreover, the 25 B
j parameters indicate any additional dierence in hirings when the new
government that follows from the elections is of a dierent political colour.
Tables 6 and 7 present the results - column 1 the rst set of 25 coecients (the estimates
of the A
j parameters) and column 2 the second set (the estimates of the B
j parameters), each
set split between the two tables. Consistent with the previous ndings, the new government
estimates are signicantly positive from 5 months before the elections (months -12, -9 and -8
also indicate signicant positive coecients). The rst month after elections also returns a
signicant estimate, as well as several months from the 6th to the 11th after the elections.
None of the coecients is negative. When considering the incremental eect from a new-colour
government, we nd a few signicantly negative coecients over the 12-month period before
elections and several negative coecients from the 6th to the 11th months after elections.
These results again indicate clear evidence of spikes in hirings before elections; they also
suggest spikes in hirings after elections. In addition, we nd that the three-month aggregation
may be too crude, in the sense that the eect arises immediately after the new government
takes oce (rst and second month). However, the eect of a new government of a dierent
colour does not seem to hold, as least from the sixth month after elections, when their negative
eects broadly cancel out the positive eects from the new government coecients, which
would be consistent with the results of equation 1.
We now turn to the more detailed specication, that controls for any correlation between
the electoral calendar and rms' hiring practices, by considering private rms too. Our
specication in this case follows from equation 2, namely by including time dummies for
all months and identifying the eects of interest from the interaction between relative month









j ENCj  SOi + SOi + t + eit; (4)
where Ej (ENCj) is short for Electionsj (ElectionsNewColourj) and SOi is a dummy
variable standing for State-Owned, equal to one if the series refers to that sector. t are
20month dummies, covering each month of the 28-year period examined.
Tables 6 and 7, columns 3 and 4, present these results. We nd, again, clear evidence of
spikes in hirings in the run-up to elections, regardless of the future change in the colour of
the government, namely from month -9 to month -2. These coecients typically range from
.4 to .5 and are signicant at least at the 10% level and in some cases also at the 5% and 1%
levels. On the other hand, the coecients on the new-colour government are almost always
insignicant before the elections, while they are very signicant and large just after the new
government takes oce. The latter coecients are .705 and .649, in the rst and second
months after elections, respectively, and both signicant at the 5% levels. The after-election
eect is also signicant for the new government variable (not necessarily of a dierent colour)
in the 6th, 7th and 8th months.
These results, in particular those of our preferred dierence-in-dierences specication,
t the predictions of our model of cronyism particularly well. For instance, the considerable
increase in hirings in the run up to elections (from month -9) is fully consistent with the
model. Moreover, the huge spike in hirings, of more than 70%, just after one month after a
new government of a dierent colour takes oce is particularly striking.
6.2 Industry analysis
Another important aspect for robustness analysis concerns the extent to which the results can
be replicated in a sector-by-sector comparison. This is relevant not only in terms of assessing
any dispersion in the results or evaluating the existence of outliers; it is also of interest in
terms of ensuring that our comparisons between state-sector and private hirings are drawn
from a common support of comparable rms, at least in terms of their industry aliation.
Here we focus on what we considered to be the ten most important industries that meet
this requirement, i.e. the largest industries which feature both private and state-sector rms.
Those industries are, in ascending order of their SIC code: food and beverages (15); other
transport equipment (35); electricity and gas (40); hotels and restaurants (55); air transport
(62); posts and telecoms (64); nance, except insurance (65); other business activities (74);
health and social work (85); and recreation and culture (92).13 Over the 1980-2008 period
considered, these ten sectors correspond to 441,575 hirings, out of a total of 1,119,338 hirings
13As the industry code changes twice over the 27-year period covered in our data, we focus on the 1995-2006
version of that code (equivalent to the ISIC revision 3.1).
21across all 56 two-digit sectors in the main data set (see Table 3). The total number of
hirings per sector over the years in the private and state sectors, rounded to thousands, are,
respectively: sector 15 (41 thousands in private sector/6 thousands in state sector), 35 (8/5),
40 (2/10), 55 (50/7), 62 (3/15), 64 (24/36), 65 (26/24), 74 (139/5), 85 (21/5), and 92 (11/6).
Table 8 presents the results of our sector-by-sector analysis, based on the extended ver-
sions of equation 2, the most inclusive specication, as in column 7 of Table 5. We nd across
virtually all industries very similar results to those obtained in the pooled analysis. In partic-
ular, the new colour (three months after) coecients and the new government (three months
before) coecients are almost always both signicant at the 5% or 1% levels and exhibit point
estimates that tend to range from .4 to .5. The two other coecients are always insignicant.
For instance, in Food and beverages, the new colour (three months after) coecient is .392
(signicant at the 5% level) and the new government (three months before) coecient is .518
(signicant at the 1% level), while the other two political-electoral coecients are insignif-
icant. The only exceptions to the pattern above arise in the air transport industry, where
the new colour coecient is almost .6 (.597) and the new government (three months before)
coecient is insignicant; and the health and social work industry, where both coecients
are insignicant, even if they are relatively large (.329 and .231).14
Overall, we regard these results as important evidence in favour of the robustness of our
ndings. They hold even when comparing hirings of state-owned and private rms within
two-digit sectors.
6.3 Data subsets
Another question we address is if there are dierences in the eects of the proximity of elections
across dierent job levels. In particular, are cronies mostly placed at top positions in state-
sector rms? We examine this question by conducting an analysis separately for each one
of the eight job levels available in the data set, drawing on the variable that sets a uniform
ranking of jobs across all rms and years.
14While the considerable post-elections `appetite' for the air transport industry (where the systematically-
loss-making ag carrier gures prominently) is consistent with anecdotal evidence, we do not have a good
explanation for the lack of signicant eects on the new government (three months before) variable, except for
random factors. On the other hand, the insignicant results for the health and social work industry may be
driven by the smaller number of months when hirings of private and state-sector rms can be observed (539)
compared with a maximum of 686 and the possibly less interesting job amenities in that industry from the
cronies' point of view.
22Table 9 presents the results, based on the most inclusive variation of equation 2. We nd
signicant eects in the same two elections variables as before in job levels 4 (highly-skilled
professionals), 5 (skilled professionals) and 6 (semi-skilled professionals). These are also three
of the most important job levels in terms of the percentage of workers they account for across
all new hires: 5.2%, 30.7% and 16.6%, for job levels 4, 5 and 6, respectively. However, in job
levels 1 (top executives) and 7 (non-skilled professionals) only one of the two election variables
are signicant (and only at the 10% level). Finally, in the remaining job levels - 2 (middle
managers), 3 (supervisors) and 8 (apprentices) - the results are not signicant. Except for
job levels 7 and 8 (which account for 22.6% and 16.5% of all new hires, respectively), these
job levels are smaller in terms of their sizes (3.9%, 2.8% and 1.7%, for job levels 1, 2 and
3, respectively). This may explain why our estimates are less signicant in those occupation
types.15
In any case, these results point strongly in the direction of eects across the rms' hi-
erarchy, rather than just a (small) subset of high-level positions and just after elections, as
antecipated from the wording of the Portuguese law. This result is also not consistent with
politically-motivated appointments, where an outgoing government may want to establish its
legacy or an incoming government may want to politicise a state-owned rm with people
sympathetic to their politics. In that case, one would expect most appointments to occur at
higher job levels, unlike what we nd here. We also nd very similar results when conducting
case studies of the largest state-owned and private rms or when considering only the subset
of rms that were privatised.
Another robustness check we conduct concerns the time span in our hirings data, in
particular regarding months that are relatively distant from the census months. As mentioned
above, this can make those observations less accurate, as short spells will be ignored. Even if
we do not know of a clear reason for a systematic correlation between such loss of accuracy
and the electoral cycle, we approached this issue by rerunning our main results (from equation
2) on the subset of hirings that involve a given maximum distance from the census month:
six or, alternatively, twelve months only. For instance, in the case of a six-month distance,
we consider only appointments from November of year t   1 to March of year t, when year t
15When focusing on hirings of workers placed at medium- to high-job levels (skilled professionals, higher-
skilled professionals, supervisors, middle managers and top executives) only, we nd results very similar to
those obtained with the full set of hirings (Table 5) - see Martins (2010).
23is from 1982 to 1993 (except 1990) and appointments from May to October of year t, when
year t is from 1994 to 2008 (except 2001). In results not reported but available upon request,
we found very similar qualitative and quantitive ndings.
We then checked if our main results hold under dierent sub-periods within our wide
1980-2008 coverage. In particular, we considered four subsets of that period: 1985-2008,
1990-2008, 1995-2008 and 1982-2000. We also considered the periods when the elections did
not take place in September (hirings up to 1989 and from 2001 to 2007). In all cases we found
the same qualitative results (and very similar quantitative results) than in the benchmark
analysis.
We also tested if there are systematic dierences between the left- and right-wing main
parties (PS and PSD) in terms of the pre- and post-elections spikes in hirings. We considered
the extended version of the specication in equation 2 (as in column 7 of Table 5) and split each
one of the four dummy variables there into left- and right-wing versions. The results (available
upon request) indicated again similar estimates than before and no signicant dierences
between the two parties.
Furthermore, in the spirit of a falsication test, we checked if the municipalities' electoral
cycle aected hirings. All coecients proved to be insignicant, as expected. The same result
was obtained when we lagged the (general) elections dates by six months or one year. We also
examined dierent specications of our benchmark results, in particular considering levels of
hirings, rather than their logarithms, and a (seasonally) dierenced dependent variable. The
results (available upon request) are again qualitatively similar to our main ndings.
Finally, we considered the eects of the hirings prompted by the election period on the total
employment of the rms aected. Unfortunately, our data does not provide information on
those variables at the same frequency as the hirings information (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya
2004). However, we were able to nd some evidence, even if not completely robust, that
employment levels increase in election years.
247 Extensions
7.1 Human capital and wages
In this extension, we examine the proles of the workers hired over the period covered in
our data in state-owned and private rms. Our goal is to investigate if there are systematic
dierences in the characteristics of the workers hired by state-owned rms in the months just
before and/or just after elections compared to workers hired by private rms. Even if our
model does not make any specic prediction about this issue, we nd it interesting to know if
cronies t a particular prole or, alternatively, if they are statistically indistinguishable from
the typical newly hired worker, even in the months just before or after elections, when we nd
pronounced spikes in hirings.
We conduct this analysis by computing the mean value of each worker characteristic in
each month in both private and state-sector rms. Specically, we consider several of the
worker characteristics available from the `Quadros' data set, namely mean schooling years,
mean (Mincer) experience, mean age, mean real hourly wage, mean wage bill, mean job level,
and the female ratio. We then estimate a specication similar to the extended version of
equation 2, except that the dependent variable is the level or the log of each of the worker
characteristics described above, rather than the count of newly hired workers.
In results not reported but available upon request, we nd that all worker characteristic
eects tend to be insignicant. Some estimates suggest higher mean wages and lower schooling,
but these results are not robust. The only exception to the lack of signicance was the results
based on the mean wage bill, which increases substantially, at a similar rate as the hirings
levels, indicating a quantity eect (which was abundantly described in our main results), but
no price eect (consistent with the lack of signicant coecients when the dependent variable
was the real hourly wage).
We conclude from this extension that cronyism is widespread across the pool of new hires
and not specic to a given group of workers, at least as one could dene them with the
variables available here (schooling, gender, age, experience, job level, and hourly pay). These
ndings are also consistent with our analysis reported in Section 6.3, where we found that the
main hirings eects arise in terms of medium-job-level positions.
257.2 Managers
In Section 3.2 we explained that public sector rms in Portugal are not directly controlled by
government ministers, even if the government is responsible for appointing the senior managers
in those rms and providing strategic guidance. One may therefore tentatively argue that the
best equivalent of general elections in the context of private-sector rms would be when private
rms undergo a change in their top management. In this case, a good understanding of the
eects of elections (and new governments taking oce) upon hirings in state-owned rms
would require a comparison with private-sector rms that similarly undergo a change in their
top management.
Here we assess to what extent private rms that undergo a change in their CEO also
exhibit systematic increases in their hirings levels just before and/or just after those events,
as we have shown for the case of public-sector rms near election periods. In particular, we
draw on our sample of private rms and identify those which exhibited turnover in their top
management position. We then use the date (month and year) when the new top manager in
the rm was promoted (or hired from the external market) to that top-management position to
create a dummy variable specic to each rm that will be one in the three months immediately
after the appointment (promotion or external hire) of the new top management and zero in
the remaining months. This is intended to follow closely our analysis for state-owned rms
only. Using the same time series of appointments that we explored for our main results and
a similar specication as that of equation 1, we estimate the partial correlation of pre- and
post-CEO-reshue in terms of the hirings of private rms.
Table 10 presents the results. The top panel includes all private rms, while the bottom
panel considers only the subset of private rms that exhibit turnover in their top management.
We also consider dierent types of dummy variables, highlighting the three (or six) months
after the new top management or the three months before, and a combination of the three
variables (unfortunately, there are no obvious equivalents to a change in political colours in the
context of private rms). All other controls used before are also considered but not reported.
In both panels, each observation corresponds to a rm-month.
We nd no evidence of systematic spikes in hirings either before or after the private rms
appoint new top managers. If anything, there is evidence that private-sector rms undergo
a period of fewer appointments, approximately 1% less, both just after and just before new
26management (column 4 of the top panel). When focusing on the subset of rms that change
ownership, the eects even double to -2.2% (over the period after the new top management
appointment).
This result may be explained by the need to understand better the rm before any new
strategy is implemented by the new CEO. This would suggest that top management would
nd it better to slow down new appointments until she has settled down in her new job.
Similarly, it may be foolish for the previous CEO to increase hirings just before the new CEO
takes over, in case the latter decides to take the rm in a dierent direction, which may not t
with the prole of those hirings. In any case, and more important, the clear contrast between
our results for public-sector rms (considerable increases in hirings just before and just after
a new government takes oce) and these results for private rms undergoing a change in their
top management (if anything, hirings slow down) makes the cronyism interpretation of the
public-sector hirings spikes even more likely.
8 Conclusions
State-owned rms can carry out a number of tasks that may be less eciently produced by
the private sector. However, it has been shown abundantly that assuming the benevolence
and public-spiritedness of the politicians overseeing or managing those rms is not always
appropriate. For instance, politicians can use those rms to give jobs to cronies, at the
expense of public- sector eciency, equity, and general welfare.
We examine this question rst by presenting a simple model of cronyism. This model
predicts spikes in appointments to state-owned rms near elections, both before and after
them, and in particular if a government of a dierent political colour takes over. These results
follow from the greater usefulness of the cronies' favours from the politicians' points of view
near elections and the simultaneous increase in the demand for appointments during those
periods. We then take this model to our data, a monthly time series of hirings across all
state-owned rms (and across a control group of private rms) in Portugal, from 1980 to
2008.
Consistent with the model, we nd that appointments to state-owned rms increase sig-
nicantly over the months just before and just after a new government takes oce. The
post-elections hirings spike is particularly strong if the new government is of a dierent po-
27litical colour than its predecessor, again as predicted by the model. All ndings hold when
taking the private sector as a control group and in many dierent subsets of the main data,
including specic industries, time periods, and job levels. The latter results point towards the
pervasiveness of cronyism within public-sector rms, not only in a small number of high-level
positions after elections.
Our evidence of cronyism suggests a considerable scope for politically-induced misallo-
cation of public resources. These results also help explain not only the performance gap
between private and public-sector rms - and the consequent gains from privatisation (Porta
& Lopez-De-Silanes 1999, Megginson & Netter 2001, Brown et al. 2006) - but also the reluc-
tance against privatisation still observed in many countries (including the one studied in this
paper). While there is considerable anecdotal evidence about cronyism in appointments to
public-sector rms, this is the rst paper that provides systematic empirical evidence about
this phenomenom. Our ndings also help devising policy approaches that could minimise
the size of the market for crony appointments. These could include restrictions on hirings
near elections and greater transparency (Ferraz & Finan 2008) on the proles and timings of
public-sector appointments.
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Notes: Vertical bars indicate the three months after a new government takes oce. Bars are darker if the
new government is of a dierent political colour than its antecessor; bars are lighter if the new government is
of the same political colour than its antecessor. State-owned rms are those owned in 50% or more by the
Portuguese state. Source: own calculations based on `Quadros de Pessoal' data set, 1982-2008.
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Notes: Vertical bars indicate the three months after a new government takes oce. Bars are darker if the
new government is of a dierent political colour than its antecessor; bars are lighter if the new government is
of the same political colour than its antecessor. Source: own calculations based on `Quadros de Pessoal' data
set.
32Tables
Table 1: Governments of Portugal, 1980-2008
Gov't no. Party/Coalition Start End New colour Elections Full majority
6 PSD+CDS+PPM Jan-80 Jan-81 x x x
7 PSD+CDS+PPM Jan-81 Sep-81 x
8 PSD+CDS+PPM Sep-81 Jun-83 x
9 PS+PSD Jun-83 Nov-85 x x x
10 PSD Nov-85 Aug-87 x x
11 PSD Aug-87 Oct-91 x x
12 PSD Oct-91 Oct-95 x x
13 PS Oct-95 Oct-99 x x
14 PS Oct-99 Apr-02 x a)
15 PSD+CDS Apr-02 Jul-04 x x x
16 PSD+CDS Jul-04 Dec-04 x
17 PS Mar-05 Oct-09 x x x
18 PS Oct-09 x
Notes: a) tie (50% of MP's, when budget approval required 50%+1). `Gov't no.' lists the government number,
in the period covered by our data. PS (`Partido Socialista', left wing) and PSD (`Partido Social Democrata',
centre/right-wing) are the two largest parties. CDS (or CDS/PP, `Centro Democr atico Social/Partido
Popular') is a smaller, right-wing party. PPM (`Partido Popular Mon arquico') is a very small party, in favour
of the reintroduction of monarchy. `Start' and `End' are the start and end dates of each government. `New
colour' refers to governments of a dierent political colour (left or right) than their immediate predecessors.
`Elections' indicates when the government resulted from general elections (x) or the resignation/death of the
prime minister and appointment of replacement. `Full majority' refers to governments that held an absolute
majority in the parliament (50% + 1 of the members of parliament, `deputados').
33Table 2: Descriptive statistics, monthly hirings
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
State-owned rms
Hirings 584.096 241.487 182 1436 342
Log hirings 6.291 0.398 5.204 7.270 342
Mean schooling years 10.382 1.522 6.631 13.435 342
Mean age 28.881 1.762 25.196 40.854 342
Mean job level 5.206 0.456 4.164 6.717 342
Mean real hourly earnings 7.054 1.531 3.813 12.045 342
Private rms
Hirings 2667.778 1113.072 758 6297 342
Log hirings 7.799 0.434 6.631 8.747 342
Mean schooling years 7.633 1.223 5.581 10.099 342
Mean age 29.994 1.919 26.603 35.891 342
Mean job level 5.94 0.284 5.043 6.592 342
Mean real hourly earnings 4.835 1.175 2.686 7.587 342
Both state-owned and private rms
Distance 6.974 5.159 0 23 342
Before 1994 0.453 0.499 0 1 342
New gov't (3 months after) 0.099 0.3 0 1 342
New colour (3 months after) 0.047 0.211 0 1 342
Notes: Hirings denote the number of individuals hired in a given month, from April 1980 to October 2008.
Schooling years are derived from the highest diploma obtained by each new hire (e.g. high school correspond to
12 years of schooling). Job level ranges from 1 (top management) to 8 (apprentice). Real hourly earnings are
measured in 2008 euros. `Distance' is a dummy variable equal to one in the period when the census month was
March. `New gov't (3 months after)' is a dummy variable equal to one in each of the three months after a new
government takes oce. `New colour (3 months after)' is a dummy variable equal to one in each of the three
months after a new government takes oce if it is of a dierent political colour than the previous government.
34Table 3: Descriptive statistics, new hires by census year
State-owned rms Private rms
Years Count Tenure Age Count Tenure Age
1982 23,942 11.5 28.8 40,673 10.0 28.3
1983 10,636 5.5 28.5 23,945 5.2 27.3
1984 7,000 5.6 29.1 17,217 5.0 27.9
1985 5,528 5.1 29.9 18,896 4.7 28.6
1986 9,444 4.9 30.8 18,235 4.7 27.9
1987 7,192 4.7 29.8 24,698 4.6 27.9
1988 7,151 5.2 28.9 30,425 4.7 28.4
1989 7,008 5.1 29.6 39,315 4.7 28.4
1991 11,975 10.5 29.2 61,767 9.6 29.2
1992 5,396 5.9 27.9 37,965 4.7 29.0
1993 5,053 6.2 30.5 32,893 4.8 29.3
1994 8,296 8.8 28.9 39,403 7.3 29.7
1995 6,896 5.1 27.6 33,263 4.9 29.3
1996 6,841 5.6 27.0 33,423 4.8 29.8
1997 7,416 5.7 27.5 36,043 4.8 30.0
1998 7,309 5.7 28.0 39,243 4.9 30.2
1999 6,267 4.9 26.5 37,372 4.6 30.0
2000 8,343 5.0 26.9 42,533 4.8 30.7
2002 13,757 10.5 28.7 65,868 9.9 32.0
2003 8,076 3.1 32.2 34,751 4.7 31.9
2004 6,713 5.1 29.8 36,146 4.9 32.0
2005 7,153 5.1 29.5 39,698 4.7 32.7
2006 6,031 5.0 28.9 41,278 4.7 32.1
2007 5,984 4.8 29.9 44,595 4.6 32.9
2008 6,312 5.3 30.1 43,974 4.5 33.0
Total 205,719 913,619
Notes: The table lists the number of new hires retrieved from each census year and some of their characteristics
(as measured in that census year and in the census month - March up to 1993 and October from 1994).
Information for the census years of 1990 and 2001 is not available. The data for these years (and 1981) was
obtained from the year immediately after.
35Table 4: Hirings by state-owned rms and the political cycle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
New gov't .150 .123 .118
(3 months after) (.040) (.050) (.052)
New colour .173 .057 .079
(3 months after) (.058) (.074) (.076)
New gov't .121 .117 .126
(3 months before) (.043) (.050) (.052)
New colour .119 .008 .014
(3 months before) (.068) (.081) (.082)
Before 1994 .071 .068 .072 .071 .066 .071 .087
(.125) (.123) (.125) (.124) (.124) (.124) (.125)
Distance -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.014
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Trend -.007 -.007 -.007 -.007 -.007 -.007 -.007
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007)
Trend2 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002)
Obs. 342 342 342 342 342 342 342
R2 .579 .575 .579 .574 .57 .574 .589
Notes: Dependent variable: log hirings per month. `New gov't (3 months later)' is a dummy variable equal
to one in each of the three months after a new government takes oce. `New colour (3 months after)' is a
dummy variable equal to one in each of the three months after a new government takes oce if it is of a
dierent political colour than the previous government. `New gov't (3 months aore)' is a dummy variable
equal to one in each of the three months before a new government takes oce. `New colour (3 months before)'
is a dummy variable equal to one in each of the three months before a new government takes oce if the new
government is of a dierent political colour than the incumbent. Other control variables (included, but not
reported - available upon request): `Before 1994' (equal to one for all months up to March 1993, after which
the census month moves to October), `Distance' (the number of months between the census date and the
month of the data), `Trend' and `Trend
2' (a quadratic trend), dummies for each month (January, February, ...,
December), and dummies for each month (January, February, ..., December) if before 1994. Robust standard
errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
36Table 5: Hirings by state-owned and private rms and the political cycle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
New gov't (3m after) .294 .094 .090
StateOwned (.105) (.143) (.143)
New colour (3m after) .514 .426 .470
StateOwned (.126) (.186) (.187)
New gov't (3m before) .372 .383 .412
StateOwned (.098) (.137) (.136)
New colour (3m before) .338 -.024 -.025
StateOwned (.131) (.185) (.186)
StateOwned -1.538 -1.533 -1.538 -1.545 -1.523 -1.545 -1.578
(.030) (.029) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.031)
Obs. 684 684 684 684 684 684 684
R2 .906 .907 .908 .908 .905 .908 .912
Notes: Dependent variable: log hirings per month. `StateOwned' is a dummy variable equal to one if the
hires concern a public (state-owned) rm. See notes to Table 4 for the description of the remaining variables.
Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
37Table 6: Eects by month, in relation to month of new government
Before-after specication DID specication
Dierent Dierent Dierent Dierent
government colour government colour
Month: -12 .163 -.385 -.027 .102
(.094) (.135) (.219) (.304)
Month: -11 .048 -.109 -.125 .576
(.068) (.163) (.175) (.266)
Month: -10 .074 -.145 .082 .416
(.072) (.105) (.168) (.223)
Month: -9 .205 -.302 .511 -.324
(.106) (.129) (.281) (.336)
Month: -8 .173 -.237 .536 -.273
(.088) (.161) (.209) (.266)
Month: -7 .073 -.153 .399 -.142
(.111) (.117) (.259) (.380)
Month: -6 .181 .020 .495 .022
(.118) (.133) (.271) (.380)
Month: -5 .255 -.096 .612 .003
(.150) (.190) (.270) (.365)
Month: -4 .234 .045 .531 .201
(.083) (.157) (.157) (.290)
Month: -3 .158 -.086 .425 -.046
(.061) (.105) (.219) (.321)
Month: -2 .215 -.269 .490 -.277
(.057) (.121) (.197) (.280)
Month: -1 .134 -.014 .255 .115
(.051) (.078) (.257) (.365)
Month: 0 .088 -.125 .109 .217
(.089) (.116) (.222) (.412)
Month: +1 .145 .130 .184 .705
(.079) (.141) (.202) (.350)
Month: +2 .082 .196 .185 .649
(.069) (.107) (.223) (.268)
Month: +3 .033 .014 .065 .351
(.136) (.148) (.275) (.342)
Month: +4 .038 -.050 .157 .235
(.120) (.132) (.255) (.332)
Month: +5 .019 .039 .156 .334
(.109) (.125) (.300) (.414)
Month: +6 .278 -.301 .417 -.090
(.061) (.148) (.154) (.354)
Notes: Dependent variable: log hirings per month. `Month: -12' is a dummy variable equal to one if a new
government takes oce 12 months after that month, ..., `Month: 0' is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is a new government takes oce that month, ..., and `Month: +12' is a dummy variable equal to one if a new
government took oce 12 months before that month. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **:
0.05; ***: 0.01.
38Table 7: Eects by month, in relation to month of new government (cont.)
Before-after specication DID specication
Dierent Dierent Dierent Dierent
government colour government colour
Month: +7 .219 -.373 .403 -.027
(.062) (.155) (.216) (.342)
Month: +8 .353 -.509 .590 -.213
(.117) (.132) (.243) (.291)
Month: +9 .223 -.381 .310 .011
(.111) (.146) (.221) (.294)
Month: +10 .100 -.252 .195 .037
(.087) (.120) (.179) (.265)
Month: +11 .218 -.350 .150 -.005
(.078) (.110) (.233) (.317)
Month: +12 .160 -.354 .105 .005
(.177) (.223) (.226) (.329)
Obs. 342 684
R2 .615 .916
Notes: See Table 6.
39Table 8: Hirings by state-owned and private rms, by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food and Transport Electricity, Hotels and Air
beverages equipment gas, etc restaurants transport
New gov't (3m after) .171 .115 .092 .068 -.156
StateOwned (.140) (.157) (.125) (.133) (.116)
New colour (3m after) .392 .419 .367 .473 .597
StateOwned (.190) (.196) (.193) (.177) (.199)
New gov't (3m before) .518 .412 .542 .415 .197
StateOwned (.141) (.162) (.161) (.142) (.125)
New colour (3m before) -.075 .049 -.281 -.031 .160
StateOwned (.192) (.210) (.200) (.189) (.196)
StateOwned -1.603 -1.642 -1.581 -1.649 -1.808
(.036) (.034) (.037) (.031) (.031)
Obs. 627 660 599 686 583
R2 .926 .916 .934 .916 .96
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post and Finance Other business Health and Recreation,
telecoms activities social work culture
New gov't (3m after) .095 .060 .066 .195 .069
StateOwned (.133) (.134) (.134) (.244) (.134)
New colour (3m after) .400 .472 .473 .329 .474
StateOwned (.191) (.177) (.177) (.279) (.177)
New gov't (3m before) .435 .407 .413 .231 .416
StateOwned (.145) (.143) (.142) (.275) (.143)
New colour (3m before) -.173 -.031 -.031 .102 -.031
StateOwned (.195) (.190) (.189) (.342) (.190)
StateOwned -1.670 -1.639 -1.646 -1.641 -1.650
(.033) (.032) (.031) (.055) (.032)
Obs. 660 682 685 539 681
R2 .921 .917 .917 .919 .916
Notes: Dependent variable: log hirings per month. Each one of the 10 blocks corresponds to a separate
regression considering data for only of the top 10 sectors, in terms of public presence. The sectors are: 15 -
Manufacture of food products and beverages; 35 - Manufacture of other transport equipment; 40 - Electricity,
gas, steam and hot water supply; 55 - Hotels and restaurants; 62 - Air transport; 64 - Post and telecommu-
nications; 65 - Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; 74 - Other business activities;
85 - Health and social work; and 92 - Recreational, cultural and sporting activities. `StateOwned' is a dummy
variable equal to one if the hires concern a public (state-owned) rm. See notes to Table 5 for the description
of the remaining variables. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
40Table 9: Hirings by state-owned and private rms: dierent job levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top Middle Supervisors, Highly-skilled
executives managers team leaders professionals
New gov't (after) -.022 .151 .209 -.259
StateOwned (.172) (.123) (.289) (.126)
New colour (after) .453 .273 .440 .938
StateOwned (.254) (.258) (.383) (.173)
New gov't (before) .157 .031 .239 .309
StateOwned (.149) (.126) (.248) (.104)
New colour (before) .142 .221 .344 -.072
StateOwned (.260) (.270) (.348) (.179)
StateOwned -.733 -1.198 -2.568 -.511
(.035) (.050) (.072) (.043)
Obs. 686 686 648 686
R2 .838 .799 .867 .83
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Skilled Semi-skilled Non-skilled Apprentices,
professionals professionals professionals trainees
New gov't (3m after) .229 .022 .388 .420
StateOwned (.159) (.176) (.278) (.241)
New colour (3m after) .137 .757 .129 .066
StateOwned (.250) (.241) (.441) (.319)
New gov't (3m before) .594 .443 .562 .185
StateOwned (.183) (.146) (.304) (.308)
New colour (3m before) -.374 .105 -.058 .205
StateOwned (.252) (.215) (.429) (.410)
StateOwned -1.706 -1.374 -2.550 -3.102
(.039) (.043) (.067) (.059)
Obs. 686 686 686 685
R2 .88 .837 .849 .919
Notes: Dependent variable: log hirings per month. The denitions of the eight job levels (as dened in
`Decreto Lei' 121/78)are: `Top executives' - denition of the rm policies, strategic planning, creating and
adapting processes; `Middle managers' - organising and adapting the guidelines established by the top exec-
utives; `Supervisors' - guiding teams, as directed by middle managers; `Highly-skilled professionals' - tasks
requiring high technical competence and dened in general terms by supervisors; `Skilled professionals' - com-
plex tasks, usually not repetitive; `Semi-skilled professionals' - well dened tasks, mainly manual or mechanical,
usually routine; and `Non-skilled professionals' - simple tasks, completely specied. `StateOwned' is a dummy
variable equal to one if the hires concern a public (state-owned) rm. See notes to Table 4 for the description
of the remaining variables. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
41Table 10: Hirings by private rms, before and after new top management
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All private rms
New top manager -.006 -.007
(3 months after) (.004) (.005)
New top manager -.010 -.011
(6 months after) (.004) (.005)
New top manager -.010 -.011
(3 months before) (.004) (.004)
Obs. 243094 243094 243094 243094
R2 .011 .374 .374 .374
Only rms with change in ownership
New top manager -.002 -.005
(3 months after) (.008) (.008)
New top manager -.022 -.022
(6 months after) (.008) (.008)
New top manager -.006 -.006
(3 months before) (.008) (.008)
Obs. 69539 69539 69539 69539
R2 .015 .371 .371 .371
Notes: Dependent variable: log hirings per month in each rm. `New top manager (3 months later)' is a
dummy variable equal to one in each of the three months after a new top manager heads the rm. `New
top manager (6 months later)' is a dummy variable equal to one in the period from the fourth to the six
month after a new top manager heads the rm. `New top manager (3 months before)' is a dummy variable
equal to one in each of the three months before a new top manager becomes head of the rm. Other control
variables (included, but not reported - available upon request): `Before 1994' (equal to one for all months up to
March 1993, after which the census month moves to October), `Distance' (the number of months between the
census date and the month of the data), `Trend' and `Trend
2' (a quadratic trend), dummies for each month
(January, February, ..., December), and dummies for each month (January, February, ..., December) if before
1994. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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